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INTRODUCTION 
Changes in the healthcare industry call for patients to become increasingly involved in 
managing their own care and for physicians to take more responsibility for improving 
the quality of care they provide. 1 As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services was tasked with developing and 
publishing public scorecards, or report cards, on the quality of care provided by certain 
physicians.2 That mandate has taken the form of Physician Compare, a federal website 
that publishes scorecards on individual physicians, and is intended to empower patients 
with additional information to make informed healthcare choices and to incentivize 
physicians to perform well.3 
The objective of this article is to examine the feasibility, benefits, and challenges of the 
federal Physician Compare scorecard website for individual physicians. Section I will 
discuss the problems of healthcare quality and cost the United States faces. Section II 
will cover the federal government's use of public reporting regulations to address cost 
and quality problems in the American healthcare system. This section will include a brief 
overview of the National Practitioner Data Bank and a description of Physician Compare, 
the federal website that is designed, in part, to publish scorecards for individual physicians. 
Section III will analyze the feasibility of Physician Compare by examining the data used 
for Physician Compare, stakeholder engagement in the reporting and publication process, 
incentives for participation in Physician Compare, and website design. 
Finally, this article concludes by arguing that Physician Compare may be able to fulfill 
its worthy goals of improving patients' engagement in their own healthcare choices 
and incentivizing physicians to provide better quality care. Physician Compare faces 
many challenges, however, in achieving these aims. In particular, Physician Compare 
has stumbled in developing both patients and physicians' basic knowledge of the site, 
which adversely affects their level of engagement with the site. The site generally lacks 
transparency around the data and analysis methods utilized to develop the quality 
metrics that are published. Physician Compare has also struggled to strike an effective 
balance between publishing comprehensive data while making the site understandable 
and user-friendly for patients and physicians. Without changes in these areas, patients 
and physicians will not realize the full benefits attainable from Physician Compare. 
I. PROBLEMS OF HEALTHCARE QUALITY AND COST 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The health care policy discussion is dominated by concerns over cost, quality, access, 
and choice. The ultimate goal seems clear: increasing quality and decreasing cost 
in United States healthcare, while retaining patient choice.4 However, the way to 
reach this goal is not obvious. 5 Defining quality is challenging, though the Institute 
Section L 
Section ILC. 
notes 54-57. 
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE 
2013). 
See 
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of Medicine provides a useful starting point: "quality of care is the degree to which 
health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired 
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge."6 Yet, even 
with this definition, the exact meaning of quality is still a moving target. Unanswered 
questions about the meaning of quality include how cost to patients fits in; the role 
of equity in access to care across the population; and whether quality simply means 
providing only needed care. 7 
Despite debate over the exact meaning of quality, there is agreement that quality and cost 
in the United States health care market must improve. The United States spends more 
per capita on healthcare than any other developed country8 but has significantly worse 
outcomes, particularly death from treatable conditions.9 Wasteful spending constitutes 
up to half of the $2.2 trillion the United States spends annually on health care. 10 A 
majority of consumers say that inefficiency in the health care system not only drives 
up cost but also decreases quality. 11 A recent study found that a decade of dramatic 
increases in health care spending (from 1999 to 2009) wiped out any income gains the 
average American family would have accrued in that period. 12 
In addition to healthcare system-wide problems of low quality and high cost, it is also 
extremely challenging for patients to find and understand information about how much 
their care will cost and the quality of that care. Two key market failures that explain this 
difficulty are (1) asymmetries in information and (2) agency relationships. 13 
Asymmetries in information, the first market failure, occur when disparate information 
is available to patients and physicians. 14 Because of the technical and complicated 
nature of information about diagnosis, treatment, and outcome, it is strikingly difficult 
in the current system for patients (and payers)15 to evaluate quality and cost of 
services. 16 At a basic level, it is challenging for patients to acquire the information 
6 id. at 27-28 Drv. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS. INST. OF MED, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FoR 
QUALITY AssuRANCE 20 N. Lohr ed. 1990)). 
See id. at 28-29. 
an 
en1nea11tn1cari~1p1L!IJJ:1ca11on1s/tJ1e-1pnc;e-cJI -e:xct:ss.lltml (defining 
>pc;uumg as "redundant, or unnecessary tests and pru1ceclm•~s ... [as well 
as] inefficient healthcare administration[,] and the cost of care necessitated conditions such as 
which can be considered preventable by lifestyle 
11 See id. 
David L Auerbach & Arthur L Kellerman, A Decade Care Cost Growth 
13 See FURROW, supra note 4, at 10. 
14 See id. 
15 See, e.g. notes 117-123 
quality of care). 
16 See FURROW, supra note 4, at 10. 
30 HEALTH AFF. 1630 (2011). 
the controversy over New York insurers' efforts to 
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necessary to "shop" for health services that are in their best interest. 17 As a result, 
patients are often passive consumers in how they select physicians. 18 When choosing a 
physician, patients with poor or fair health status are even less likely than the general 
population to actively seek out formal quality information and may be more likely to 
seek out informal advice from friends. 19 Physician scorecards could help all patients 
become more active consumers in the selection of their physicians by decreasing the 
cost and time necessary to weigh the costs and benefits of seeking care. 20 Moreover, 
by easing access to information, scorecards could have a particularly positive impact 
for those in poor health, for whom quality of care may matter more to than the general 
population. 21 
The second market failure that makes it difficult for patients to access and understand 
quality and cost information is agency relationships. These relationships occur when 
people "purchase" health services through at least one agent-an employer that provides 
and subsidizes their health insurance, their health insurer, and/or their physician-who 
guides their choices and may be subject to conflicts of interest in that guidance.22 As 
a result, patients may they feel they do not have power over their health care choices, 
thus contributing to their role as passive consumers. While scorecards are not a cure-
all, 23 they may aid patients in gaining more control over their choice of physician24 and 
allowing them to become better advocates in interactions with these agents. 
To remedy these issues, the federal government's efforts over the years, particularly 
with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), have promoted two goals. 
The first goal is expanding the role of the marketplace through disseminating quality 
information to consumers so that buyers of health services will reject lower-quality and 
higher-cost services. 25 The second goal is changing reimbursement models through 
setting and incentivizing quality standards.26 
17 Id. at 11. 
18 See Katherine M. Harris, How Do Patients Choose a National Survey 
in Plans, 38 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 711, 712- l 4 (2003). 
19 See id. at 711. 
20 See id. at 713. 
21 See id. at 714. 
22 
23 
"'"""f""• insmers choose which are included in their covered network of 
24 
25 See Furrow, 
26 See id. 
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II. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE QUALITY 
THROUGH PUBLIC REPORTING 
A. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) 
Quality reporting as a response to problems in the American health care system has been 
in place for over twenty-five years, though it has evolved significantly over time. 
Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) in 1986,27 
which is a notable milestone in health care quality reporting because it significantly 
strengthened federal regulation of physicians and quality of care. 28 The HCQIA aimed 
to improve quality by offering immunity from liability for peer review committees29 and 
by creating a national, centralized databank for negative actions against physicians.30 
For the purposes of this article, the most important element of the HCQIA was the 
establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank (the Data Bank) and related 
requirements. In response to a perceived medical malpractice crisis,31 Congress 
developed the Data Bank to prevent physicians who had disciplinary histories in one 
state from moving to another state and practicing undetected.32 
Health care entities must report adverse actions, credentialing decisions, and licensure 
decisions for individual physicians to the Board of Medical Examiners, which is then 
required to report to the Data Bank.33 Information in the Data Bank is only available 
to professional users, including medical boards and hospitals, but not the public.34 If 
a health care entity fails to report, the Secretary publishes the name of the entity in the 
Federal Register and the entity is given notice and opportunity to correct its failure; if the 
entity still does not report, it will lose its civil damages immunity. 35 Hospitals are required 
to check the Data Bank for this information before granting privileges to a physician and 
every two years thereafter for physicians holding privileges at the hospital.36 
From the 1990s onward, states responded to pressure to make information from the 
Data Bank publicly available by establishing state-run systems to publish this data.37 
These systems provide a narrow window into quality of care, as they focus on adverse 
27 Health Care Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 402, 100 Stat. 3784 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2012)). 
28 See Kristin M. Madison, From HCQIA To The ACA: The Evolution 
Improvement Tool, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 65 (2012). 
29 See HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 111111 (2012). 
30 See id. at§§ l 11131-33. 
31 See, e.g., Elisabeth Ryzen, M.D., The National Practitioner Data Bank; Problems 
13 J. LEGAL MED. 409 (1992) the and of the Data Ban1c). 
32 See42U.S.C.§llJOl. 
33 See id. at§ 11133. 
34 See id. at§ 11137. 
35 See id. at§ 11133. 
36 See id. at 11135. 
37 See Madison, supra note 28, at 87--88. 
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actions, rather than outcomes and process measurements.38 For example, in 1996, 
Massachusetts created and made available to the public individual physician profiles 
that included information from the Data Bank, such as education and training, medical 
malpractice and criminal history, and licensure and hospital actions.39 Most states now 
provide at least some information on board disciplinary action online, but the breadth of 
information published varies.40 For example, North Carolina required the publication of 
malpractice information online in 2009.41 In 2011, Illinois passed the Patient's Right to 
Know Act, which requires a broader range of information on physicians to be publicly 
available, similar to the Massachusetts system.42 
Although the "Q" in HCQIA stands for quality, the Data Bank provides a limited snapshot 
of quality.43 The Data Bank only documents information like malpractice settlements 
and disciplinary actions, not the quality of care provided for a specific condition or even 
in general.44 New reporting systems, such as Physician Compare, have been developed 
to try to capture more meaningful and comprehensive quality information than that 
provided in the Data Bank. While new health care quality reporting systems are not 
perfect, they are more comprehensive than the Data Bank and now usually include 
"measures of provider quality based on providers' characteristics (such as education 
or resources available), the process of care (such as whether care was delivered in 
accordance with accepted guidelines), or patient outcomes (such as whether a patient 
dies, is readmitted, or feels better)."45 
B. The Affordable Care Act 
The Patient ProtectionandAffordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted in 2010.46 While much 
of the ACA is focused on improving access to health insurance,47 quality improvement 
is a central tenet of the Act.48 The ACA includes a number of provisions aimed at 
developing and disseminating reliable data on quality and cost.49 The ACA defines 
quality as "a standard for measuring the performance and improvement of population 
health or health plans, providers of services, and other clinicians in the delivery of health 
care services."50 Quality goals include improving patient health outcomes and functional 
38 See id. 
39 See Frances H. Miller, Choice: 
Public, 8 LoY. CoNSUMERL REv. 125, 127 (1995-1996). 
40 See Meredith Larson et al., 2006 Report 
PuBuc CITIZEN (Oct 17, 2006), 
41 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 2009-217 
42 See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 61/10(2015). 
43 Madison, supra note 28, at 68. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L No. l l 1-148, 124 Stat. 119 as 
amended in scattered sections of26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
See Madison, 
48 See FURROW, 
49 See id. at 34. 
note 28, at 64. 
note 4, at 32. 
50 42 US.C. § 299b-3 l l (2010). 
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status; making patients part of the decision-making process through patient-centered 
care; and providing care that is timely, effective, safe, efficient, and innovative.51 
Two federal agencies within the Department of Health & Human Services share primary 
responsibility for public reporting of quality data under the ACA: (1) the Agency for 
Healthcare Research & Quality (AHRQ) and (2) the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). The AHRQ is tasked with supporting research on the science of public 
reporting and setting priorities for improving quality.52 AHRQ publishes state- and 
federal-level aggregate data, and does not report on individual physicians.53 CMS is 
tasked, in part, with preparing and posting scorecards on hospitals, physicians, and 
other health care providers who participate in Medicare's new value-based purchasing 
program, which bases payment partly on whether providers achieve targets for delivering 
higher-quality care.54 As part of this work, CMS is mandated to establish Physician 
Compare, a website for publicly posting quality data on individual physicians.55 
C. Physician Compare 
Compare websites existed prior to the ACA. For instance, Hospital Compare was 
created in 2002, with the dual aim of helping patients make more informed decisions 
about their hospital choices and incentivizing hospitals to provide higher-quality 
care. 56 Hospital Compare now publishes quality information on approximately 4,000 
hospitals, and the data information available is much more robust than that published 
on Physician Compare.57 
Pursuant to its statutory authority under the ACA,58 CMS launched Physician Compare 
in 2010 with a two-fold purpose: (1) to "[p]rovide information to help consumers 
make informed decisions about their health care; and (2) to "create clear incentives for 
physicians to perform well."59 At the time of writing, the site has quality data on some 
group practices, as well as biographical information posted for individual physicians and 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at § 299b-33. 
53 See James, supra note 24 at 2. 
54 42 lJ.S.C. § 1395vvv1. 
55 See id. at§ 1395w-5 (2010). 
56 See Compare, CMS.Gov, 
payments). 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-5. 
information, responses from 
and effective care, the likelihood a 
readmission and death rates, use of medical 
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quality data for some individual physicians.60 Physician Compare also provides quality 
data for certainACOs, although that information is available on a different webpage.61 
1. Data 
CMS is publishing information on Physician Compare in two phases, focusing first on 
group practices andACOs and then on individual physicians.62 Physician Compare has 
and will only report on physicians,63 group practices, and ACOs that provide Medicare 
services.64 The underlying quality data comes from the Physician Quality Reporting 
System (PQRS), which is also run by CMS.65 PQRS is a "pay-for-reporting program 
that gives eligible professionals incentives and payment adjustments if they report 
quality measures satisfactorily."66 Entities choose which PQRS measures they want to 
report to CMS.67 Participants have to report on at least nine measures and meet certain 
criteria,68 but they still have a fair amount of leeway in choosing those measures. In 
addition, they are required to report on only fifty percent of their Medicare Part B Fee-
for-Service (FFS) patients.69 
The group practice and ACO measures come from a subset of PQRS data known as 
PQRS Group Practice Reporting Option andACO GPRO. These measures "encourage[] 
eligible group practices [and ACOs] to report information about the quality of care they 
provide to people with Medicare who have certain medical conditions."70 In 2014, 
CMS published on Physician Compare the 2012 PQRS GPRO Diabetes Mellitus 
(DM) and coronary artery disease (CAD) metrics for the group practices and ACOs 
60 See inft-a Section II.c.1. 
61 See Section II.c. 1. and HI.d. 
62 See About Physician Compare, supra note 59; inft'O Section !I.e. 1. 
63 CMS uses the term "Eligible Professionals" (EPs) to characterize individual providers, but in 
an effort to minimize the use of additional abbreviations here, this paper will refer to individual 
physicians. EPs are those who are paid under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) and 
include, among others: physicians, physician assistants, nmse practitioners, social workers, 
psychologists, physical therapists, and occupational therapists. Eligible Professionals, CMS. 
Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instrmnents/PQRS/ 
dmvnloads/ eligibleprofessionals. pdf 
64 See A bout Physician Compare, supra note 59. 
65 See id 
66 Id 
67 How to Get Started: 2016 PQRS, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-
Patient-Assessmen1-instrmnents/PQRS/How_To_Get_Started.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2015). 
68 See id 
69 See, e.g, 2015 Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS): Registry Reporting Made Simple 
(2015), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-instrmnents/PQRS/ 
Dow.nloads/2015_PQRS_Registry_Reporting_Made_Simple.pdf Medicare Part B covers outpatient 
care, including doctors' services. See Signing up for Part A and B, MEDICARE .Gov, https://www. 
medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/get-parts-a-and-b/when-how-to-sign-up-for-part-a-and-part-b. 
html#collapse-3100. 
7° Compare: Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), MEDICARE.Gov, https://v.T\~r\v. 
medica:re.gov/physiciancompare/staticpages/data/pqrs.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) [hereinafter 
Physician Compare: PQRS]. 
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that successfully participated in PQRS.71 Later in 2014, CMS published the 2013 
PQRS GPRO and Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) DM and CAD measures for 
139 group practices, 214 Shared Savings Program ACOs,72 and 23 Pioneer ACOs.73 
However, it is important to note that although the ACO data is published on a website 
with Physician Compare in the name, it is actually available on a different page than the 
data for group practices and individual physicians.74 
CMS is taking a phased-in approach to publishing quality measures over time,75 
particularly for individual physicians. As of this writing, Physician Compare publicly 
reports quality measures for group practices and ACOs. Individual physicians currently 
have biographical information (e.g., education) and green check marks indicating 
the federal quality programs in which they participate,76 and approximately 175,000 
individual physicians also have quality measures listed.77 
CMS has moved and is moving forward with posting quality measures for individual 
physicians, but has somewhat scaled back in terms of what data it plans to publish in 
the immediate future. CMS announced in the Calendar Year (CY) 2013 Physician Fee 
Schedule (PFS) Final Rule with Comment Period that it intended to publicly report on 
2014 PQRS quality metrics for individual physicians, consistent with§ 10331 of the 
ACA, as early as CY 2015. 78 Despite concerns, in the CY 2014 Physician Fee Schedule 
71 See About Physician Compare, supra note 59. 
72 In a Shared Savings ACO, providers are jointly accountable for the quality of care they provide 
and earn back from CMS some of the savings generated from providing higher-quality, lower-cost 
care. Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, Kt\ISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept 14, 
2015), http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/. Pioneer Program ACOs are 
high-performing health systems that can pocket more of the financial savings in return for taking on 
more financial risk Id. 
73 Quality Data and Physician Compare, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-
Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/physician-compare-initiative/Quality-Data-and-
Physician-Compare- .html (last updated Jun. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Quality Data and Physician 
Compare]. 
74 See infra Section IH.c. Physician Compare for group practice and individual physicians and other 
providers is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/. Physician Compare for 
ACOs is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/aco/search.htmL (last updated 
Jun. 15, 2016). 
75 See About Physician Compare, supra note 59. 
76 See Quality Data and Physician Compare, supra note 73. Where available, the site lists the 
following for individual physicians and other providers: name; address; primary and secondary 
specialties; affiliation with a group practice; clinical training information; gender; languages spoken 
(other than English); hospital affiliation; American Board of Medical Specialties board certification 
information; whether physician accepts Medicare assignn1ent; and indicator of satisfactory reporting 
under the PQRS Incentive Program, Electronic Prescribing Incentive Program, and Electronic 
Health Record Incentive Program. SYLVIA MATHEWS BuRWELL, CMS PHYSICIAN COMPARE REPORT 
TO CONGRESS v-vi (2014 ), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/physician-compare-initiative/Dovvnloads/Physician-Compare-Report-to-Congress. pdf 
77 See 2015 Individual Clinician Measures: Publicly Reported on Physician Compare in December 
2016, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Jnitiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/physician-compare-initiative/Downloads/PC-2015-Clinician-Measures.pdf 
78 See 78 Fed. Reg. 43281, 43355 (July 19, 2013). 
9 
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Final Rule, CMS planned to make available twenty 2013 individual PQRS measures 
collected through a registry, electronic health record (EHR), or claims if "technically 
feasible."79 However, CMS then decided to publish fewer measures, and from a different 
year, due to technical concerns and stakeholder feedback.so In December 2016, CMS 
expanded the number of quality measures publicly reported on Physician Compare for 
individuals, with data collected from claims and registry systems.s1 Moving forward, 
CMS will continue to annually post green check marks for each quality program in 
which individual physicians participate.s2 CMS plans to continue phasing in more 
measures for individual physicians and group practices. s3 
Certain metrics will not be published on Physician Compare for individual physicians. 
CMS' rationale for not including these measures, as well as analysis of CMS' decisions 
regarding these measures, is discussed in Section III.A., below. The site will not 
include patient satisfaction scores for individual physicians, though these scores will 
be published for group practices. s4 Adverse actions, such as malpractice settlements, 
that are stored in the Data Bank will also be unavailable on Physician Compare for 
individual physicians. ss Furthermore, the site will not include cost metrics. s6 
2. Physician Engagement 
Although the ACA requires CMS to consider stakeholder input when selecting quality 
measures for Physician Compare, CMS has struggled to develop strong engagement 
among stakeholders. s7 As a result, CMS has implemented a number of strategies to 
engage physicians and other healthcare entities in Physician Compare. For instance, 
the agency has solicited input from professional stakeholders, including healthcare 
providers and health systems, through rulemaking processes and outreach efforts, such 
as town halls, webinars, and panels. ss 
However, physicians who do or will have quality data published on Physician Compare 
have limited options for input regarding their own data. As required under §1033l(b) 
of the ACA, individual physicians have a 30-day preview period (though this may be 
79 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67765 (Nov. 13, 2014) 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74453-54) (Dec. I 0, 
2013)). 
80 See 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67773 (Nov. 13, 2014). Commenters raised concerns that the PQRS data 
surmoseato be was collected in 2013, when individual 
to be collected and jJUC>HO,C<vU 
81 See 2015 Individual Clinician lvfeasures: 
supra note 77. 
82 See 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
83 See 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67768 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
84 
85 
did not know 
86 See id 
87 of the Affordable Care Act 
from multi-stakeholder groups, consistent with sections 
1890A of the Act, when measures for Compare. 
88 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
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extended) to view quality data before it is published to Physician Compare. 89 Physicians 
can use the Physician Compare Lookup Tool to determine if they have performance 
scores available for preview and, if so, what their scores are. 90 However, there will not be 
an appeals process in which physicians could dispute the quality data that is published.91 
The 30-day preview period does not apply to demographic data,92 but feedback from 
stakeholders about this limitation has had some effect. Physicians expressed concerns 
about inaccuracies in their demographic information, specialty, and hospital affiliation, 
which drove CMS to release steps for physicians to update their biographical data.93 
Now, physicians can submit updates to the Provider Emollment, Chain, and Ownership 
System (PECOS), which is the underlying Medicare database that auto-populates the 
Physician Compare website with this information, or to contact CMS directly.94 CMS 
has also updated the underlying PECOS database and incorporated Medicare claims 
data to verify professionals' demographic information; while there are still complaints 
about lags in updating, physicians have provided positive feedback on these changes.95 
Moving forward, the agency states that it is "continually working to improve [Physician 
Compare] and the administrative and demographic information included."96 
3. Incentives to Participate 
Physicians have no direct incentive to participate in Physician Compare because the data 
is pulled automatically from PQRS.97 However, the introduction of financial penalties 
for failure to participate in PQRS, which began as a voluntary reporting system, has 
incentivized the participation of physicians and other entities. 98 
There is some indication that the quality information published on Physician Compare, 
which is based on PQRS data, may soon be used to determine how much Medicare 
will reimburse individual physicians-a shift that could be of great importance to 
physicians. CMS already uses the PQRS data in its value-based purchasing program 
89 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74447 (Dec. 10, 2013); see also CMS.Gov., Guide to ""'""''""' 
Preview Period, nm"·1mr.xrw 
physician-compare-initiative/ downloads/guide _to __ physician_compare_preview _period.pelf (last 
visitedFeb.14, 2017). 
to_physician_compare __ preview _period.pdf (last visited Feb.14, 2017). 
91 See Compare, supra note 73 ("[T]here will not be a formal 
process. If measure data is collected and deemed suitable for pub[l]ic reporting, the data will be 
published on Physician Compare. All data will be published of whether measure 
was confirmed."). 
92 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67770 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
93 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74447 (Dec. 10, 2013). 
94 Id. 
95 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
96 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67768 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
97 See supra Section U.C. l. 
98 See 
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to calculate the value modifier.99 The value modifier "provides for differential payment 
to a physician or group of physicians under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule 
(PFS) based upon the quality of care furnished compared to the cost of care during 
a performance period."100 The value modifier was originally only used for physician 
groups with at least 100 eligible professionals, but will be phased in over time, and is set 
to apply in 2018 to physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, clinical nurse 
specialists, and certified registered nurse anesthetists who are solo practitioners and/ 
or in groups of two or more eligible professionals. 101 In its 2014 report to Congress, 
CMS stated that it is already attempting to align Physician Compare with the value 
modifier and implies that the data in Physician Compare could eventually be more 
tightly integrated into a value-based payment model for physicians. 102 
4. Website Design 
The Physician Compare website has already undergone a number of design iterations 
and will continue to evolve moving forward. Since the site's initial launch, CMS has 
done a full redesign and improved the search functionality. 103 
Additionally, benchmarking will not be used for individual physicians or group plans. 104 
CMS was concerned that benchmarking would be difficult for consumers to understand; 
that arbitrary thresholds may magnify minor performance differences; and that the 
benchmark would be calculated inconsistently as compared to benchmarks CMS uses 
in other programs. 1 os 
At the time the CY 2015 rule was finalized, CMS had also decided not to include any 
other type of system in which physicians would be ranked against one another. 106 Rather, 
the site displays performance rates visually, using a combination of numbers and five 
stars, with each star symbolizing twenty percent. 107 
In an effort to avoid overwhelming and confusing consumers moving forward, CMS 
plans to include all measures in a downloadable file, but will not include all available 
99 See Design, CMS.Gov, nnr1<·1m~'m' 
Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-instrurnents/PQRS/How ___ To_Get__Started.html 
15, 2016). 
101 See id. 
Toolkit). 
103 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67762 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
104 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67774 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
105 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
106 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67776 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
107 See id. 
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data on the website itself. 108 CMS plans to do concept testing with consumers to see how 
well they understand each measure and which measures allow them to become more 
informed consumers. 109 Only measures that are understood by consumers and relevant 
to patients making informed decisions will be included in the website. no 
CMS conducts an online survey of visitors to Physician Compare. On average, Physician 
Compare receives approximately 140,000 visits per month, with traffic spiking during 
open enrollment periods for Medicare beneficiaries. rn On a five-point scale where 1 is 
"very hard" and 5 is "very easy," approximately three-quarters of survey respondents 
rated the site 3 out of 5 for ease of finding information and website navigation. 112 
III.ANALYSIS OF PHYSICIAN COMPARE 
A.Data 
While CMS initially aimed to publish data from claims, registries, and EHRs, 113 its 
strategy has been to publicly report only that data that is "technically feasible."ll4 As 
a result, CMS first planned to publish scores for 2014 PQRS measures gathered only 
through claims, then expand later to data gathered through registries and EHRs, 115 and 
now publishes data collected via claims and registries. 116 
This preliminary and continuing use of claims data combined with a relatively small 
minimum sample size of twenty patients117 may open CMS up to legal challenges, 
as was seen in New York in 2007. A number of major New York insurers developed 
individual physician quality reporting programs, and New York's Office of the Attorney 
General issued letters to these insurance companies expressing concern about how they 
evaluated individual physicians. 118 The Attorney General's office eventually reached a 
settlement with the insurers by working with the insurers themselves, the American 
Medical Association, the Medical Society of the State of New York, and consumer 
advocacy groups.ll 9 The settlement terms included changes to the way the insurers 
collected and utilized quality metrics for individual physicians. 
108 See Compare Datasets, CMS.Gov, 
visited Feb. 27, 2017); 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67769 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 Burwell, supra note 102, at 4 l. 
112 Id. at 42. 
113 78 Fed. Reg. 43281, 43355 19, 2013). 
114 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74453 (Dec. 10, 2013). 
115 See supra note 79; see also About Yfnmc·wn 
116 See 2015 Individual Clinician Measures: 
December, supra note 77. 
117 See Burwell, supra note 102, at 19. 
118 See, e.g., Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, Counsel for Econ. & Soc. Justice, State ofN.Y., Office 
Gen. Counsel, Aetna (Aug. 16, 2007), hm,·11'.umm 
[hereinafter, Aetna Letter]. 
119 See, e.g., Press Release, Attorney General of the State of New York, Agreement '-·vmAM""''° 
Performance Measurement, and Programs (Nov. 13, 2007), 
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For example, Aetna developed a physician-ranking program in which specialists were 
ranked by quality and those who met certain quality standards were included in-network; 
employers who selected the insurance plan with the physician-ranking program could 
offer incentives to their employees to use that network. 120 The Attorney General stated 
that the program carried "a significant risk of causing consumer confusion, if not 
deception."121 The Attorney General was especially concerned that the use of claims 
data in ranking specialists would lead to an omission of clinically relevant information, 
creating a system that is "inaccurate," "misleading," and not transparent. 122 The Attorney 
General's particular concerns with the use of the claims data were: (1) claims data does 
not include relevant information that would be available through other sources, such as 
medical records; (2) the claims database is too small to create reliable rankings; (3) the 
sample size (per physician) may be too small to allow for meaningful results; and ( 4) 
many physicians may care for a patient during a clinical episode, so the quality metrics 
should not be unfairly attributed to just one physician. 123 
The first critique is directly applicable to Physician Compare, in that claims data 
is inherently not comprehensive. The second critique may be less applicable to 
Physician Compare because a claims database on a national scale is much larger than 
that available to one insurer in one state. However, some commenters of the CMS 
Physician Compare plan echoed the Attorney General's fourth concern that data would 
be inaccurately attributed. 124 
As to the third concern, while not specific to claims data, commenters of the CMS 
plan have critiqued Physician Compare's minimum sample size of 20 patients per 
physician125 as too small. They are concerned a small sample size would not produce 
enough information at the individual physician level to develop accurate sample sizes 
and comparisons. 126 These concerns are grounded in real-world practice patterns, as 
individual physicians see only a few patients compared to the number of patients a 
hospital sees in the aggregate. 127 Consequently, scorecards for individual physicians 
may not be representative of the care individual physicians actually provide, in that a 
few patients could skew results. 
On the other hand, the 20-patient sample size is similar to others in the quality reporting 
arena. This sample size matches that used as a reliability threshold for PQRS reporting128 
[hereinafter, Aetna Settlement]. 
120 Aetna Letter, note 118. 
121 Id. at 1. 
122 Id. at 2. 
m id. 
124 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74453 (Dec. 10, 2013). 
125 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67769 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
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128 See 77 Fed. Reg. 68891, 69165 (Nov. 2012); see 
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and is only ten patients fewer than the Joint Commission's required sample size of thirty 
for hospitals' National Quality Improvement Goals. 129 
In response to commenters' concerns about the sample size and other issues, CMS stated: 
We ... believe strongly that individual-level measure data are important 
in helping consumers make informed healthcare decisions, and that this 
information should be posted on the site as soon as technically feasible .... 
We are committed to including only the most accurate, statistically reliable and 
valid quality of care measure data on Physician Compare when the data are 
publicly reported. Any data found to be invalid or inaccurate for any reason will 
not be publicly reported. 130 
More specifically, CMS argued that the measures in question are already in use in the 
PQRS program and have already undergone significant review. 131 CMS simply stated 
that it believes attribution of care will be accurate on the site. 132 In future years, CMS will 
continue to make sure measures are appropriately selected and reported. 133 Only data 
that meets the accepted sample size will be reported, and CMS will evaluate language to 
explain to the public why all individual physicians do not have data published. 134 
While CMS goals make sense, CMS still has room to learn from the important 
lessons arising from the New York insurance settlements before publishing data for 
individual physicians. CMS must be sure that the data is accurate, such that a few 
patients within the sample do not artificially inflate or deflate an individual physician's 
scores. The reasoning for picking the sample size and any methodology utilized to 
present data, including risk adjustment and attribution methods, must be both accurate 
and transparent to physicians. CMS must also ensure that the sample size adequately 
protects patient privacy. A small sample size may allow patients to be more easily 
identified by their distinctive characteristics. For example, within a small sample 
size, one variable (e.g. diagnosis, race, or gender) may be small enough to deduce the 
identity of that individual patient. 135 
Precise methodology and transparency is important not just for data accuracy but also 
to prevent harming high-risk patients. Individual score cards in general, and Physician 
Compare in particular, have generated worries that physicians will cherry-pick patients 
in an effort to improve their scores. Commenters of the CMS plan for Physician Compare 
were especially worried that doctors may be incentivized to tum away patients who have 
131 See 
132 See 
133 id. 
134 See 
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low health literacy, are poor, and/or are minorities often subject to healthcare inequities 
because these patients could lower the physicians' quality ratings. 136 
This is a concern that has played out, to some extent, in New York's reporting system for 
mortality outcomes of cardiac surgeries, which publishes quality data for both hospitals 
and individual physicians by name. 137 Critics have contended that, as a result of the New 
York scorecards, higher-risk patients who need surgery are not receiving the intervention 
they need in New York. 138 Rather, the system forces these patients to go to another state 
for care. 139 In contrast, proponents of the New York system argue that it allows for 
identification of inferior practices and minimizes the performance of procedures that 
have an unjustifiably low chance of success. 140 They also contend that the scorecards 
have significantly reduced the risk of dying from cardiac bypass surgery141 and that 
hospitals with low-rated physicians have lost market share. 142 
In response to concerns that physicians will choose not to treat high-risk and vulnerable 
patients, CMS argued that data collection at the hospital and group level has not led 
to cherry picking of patients, so there is no reason to believe it will cause individual 
physicians to turn away patients. 143 To further address concerns about potential 
cherry picking, CMS plans to evaluate risk adjustment methodologies to make sure 
that physicians with high-risk patient populations are not unduly penalized. 144 Risk 
adjustment is a statistical process that adjusts quality measurements by accounting for 
patients' characteristics that "may independently affect results of a given measure and 
are not randomly distributed across all physicians submitting quality measures."145 
These characteristics may include the type and severity of illness, patient demographics 
such as race and wealth, and insurance status. 146 Risk adjustment is intended to allow for 
136 See id. 
137 See New York State Department of Health, Adult Cardiac Surgery in New York State: 2009-2011 
(2014 ), https://w\vw.healih. ny. gov/statistics/ diseases/ cardiovascular/heart_disease/ docs/20092011_ 
adult_cardiac_surgery.pdf. 
138 See Todd Rosengart, York States Reporting Surgery Data: 
When a List is Not a List, RosE BROOK SCH. OF MED. BLOG (Apr. 3, 2012), http:! /medicine. 
stonybrookmedicine.edu/surgery/blog/understanding-new-york-states-reporting-of-heart-surgery-
outcome-data. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See Edward Hannan et al., New York States Cardiac Surgery Reporting System: Four 
Years Later, 58 ANNALS OF THORACIC SuRGERY J 852,1852 (1994), 
pubmed/7979781; see also Daryl Hoffman, Cardiac Surgery Reporting in NY. State: ls It Reliable?, 
METRO (Apr. 28, 2013), http://w'\vw.metro.us/lifestyle/cardiac-surgery-reporting-in-ny-state-is-it-
reliable/tm WmdB---a3A95ay ABGCU/. 
142 See David Dranove and Andrew Sfekas, Start the News: A Structural Estimate 
Cards, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1201,1201 (2008). 
143 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74453 (Dec. 10, 2013). 
144 See id. 
145 Minn. Dep't of Health, Minnesota Statewide Reporting and Measurement System: 
Ph1mr·inn Clinic Measures, 1, 2 (2011), http://www.health.state.mn.us/ 
healthreform/measurement/MDHRiskAdjustmentProposal.pdf. 
146 See id. 
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a more fair comparison of patient outcomes across physicians by adjusting for patient 
factors beyond the control of physicians. 147 
Although CMS has stated that it will implement risk adjustment as required under 
the ACA, 148 a risk adjustment formula is not clearly stated in the regulations. Rather, 
CMS generally says, "we will continue to analyze the measure data to ensure that risk 
adjustment concerns are taken into consideration," then refers readers to a Technical 
Expert Panel website. 149 
In setting a risk adjustment formula, CMS could again learn from the experience of 
the New York cardiac outcomes reporting system. 150 The system is risk adjusted, and 
the factors considered include age, the heart's pumping capacity, and previous heart 
attacks. 151 In certain situations, for example, the death of a high-risk patient may only 
count for half of mortality in the report. 152 As a result, doctors should not experience 
decreased ratings for care provided to high-risk patients, thereby reducing the risk of 
doctors cherry-picking patients. 153 Some critics have argued, however that this system 
still promotes gaming, 154 perhaps because physicians do not understand or trust the risk 
adjustment formula. 
In addition to concerns about cherry picking, CMS will also have to balance the benefits 
of including a robust risk adjustment formula with the potential for such an adjustment 
to deplete the quality data of meaning. On the positive side, CMS could foster physician 
buy-in by allowing physicians to have input regarding the risk adjustment formula. Risk 
adjustment could also allow for the data to more accurately reflect the care provided, in 
that higher risk patients would be given different weight than lower risk patients and not 
artificially deflate a physicians' metrics. However, risk adjustment also introduces new 
variables that increase the difficulty of making the data transparent and accessible for 
both patients and physicians who are not well versed in risk adjustment methodology. 
Changing the formula each year also introduces the risk that comparing data across 
years could become an essentially meaningless exercise. 
Analyzing what is not included in Physician Compare is just as important as analyzing 
what is included. CMS currently does not plan to publish patient satisfaction scores 
for individual physicians. Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
147 id. 
148 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 46, at§ 1395w. 
149 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67765 (Nov. 14, 2014). 
150 78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74453 (Dec. 10, 2013). 
151 David Dranove & Andrew Sfekas, Start the News: A Structural Estimate 
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( CAHPS) surveys ask patients about their satisfaction and experience with healthcare, 155 
results of which will be published on Physician Compare for group practices. 156 
However, CAHPS measures for individual physicians are not currently collected, so 
patient satisfaction data will not be published on the Physician Compare website. 157 
Some commenters have expressed concerns that CAHPS surveys are too subjective and 
expensive to conduct. 158 Commenters are also concerned that certain CAHPS measures 
do not capture aspects of care, such as getting timely care, appointments, and access to 
specialists, all of which individual physicians do not control. 159 It is unclear if patient 
satisfaction metrics will ever to be included, and if so, how they will be developed. 
Despite CMS' hesitance about publishing CAHPS patient satisfaction scores, the 
increased industry focus on "patient-centered care," has led to the publication of 
many surveys on patient satisfaction. 160 In addition to industry interest in quality, the 
publication of satisfaction scores for individual physicians on consumer sites such as 
HealthGrades.com and AngiesList.com may suggest that patients would like to see 
this type of data, and potentially would use patient satisfaction scores published on 
Physician Compare. 
While consumer preference may incentivize the publication of patient satisfaction 
measures, there are also additional reasons not to publish this data regardless of the 
source. First, publication of patient satisfaction data may distract attention and resources 
from publishing accurate and understandable quality metrics. 161 Second, consumers can 
ask friends and family members about their satisfaction with a particular physician in 
a way that is helpful for their decision-making without turning to a website. However, 
the average layperson does not have the ability to aggregate, analyze, and present the 
technical quality measures that would be available on Physician Compare. 162 
At this point, it is not clear if patient satisfaction would be well received by patients or 
physicians. With so many survey options and pros and cons to consider, CMS should 
consider conducting additional research on whether patient satisfaction scores would 
be useful for patients and physicians. If so, CMS may then aim to determine the most 
effective methodology for gathering and presenting this data. 
In addition to patient satisfaction scores, CMS also does not currently plan to publish 
any cost data on Physician Compare for individual physicians. A potential downside of 
1ss SeeAbout C4HPS, AHRQ, 
2015). 
!S6 See Data 
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publishing cost information is that "[c]onsumers may be encouraged to choose doctors 
because they are cheap rather than because they are good."163 It may also not be clear if 
the published data reflects the amount charged to the insurer or the out-of-pocket cost 
the patient would be responsible for paying. This lack of clarity could decrease any 
utility the cost data would have in helping patients make informed choices. 
On the other hand, cost and quality are not always mutually exclusive, particularly in 
the new regulatory era of increasing both value and quality. Cost is important in many 
patients' healthcare decisions 164 and high costs may lead to negative effects on patients' 
mental and physical health. 165 When patients are ultimately financially responsible for 
their own care, some patients may seek out physicians who provide less expensive, but 
not higher quality, care. 166 Giving patients the data to make that choice in an informed 
manner is not necessarily a bad outcome. 
One approach CMS could consider in publishing cost measures is that taken in the New 
York insurance settlement agreements, which established a new reporting system. The 
New York Attorney General and stakeholders agreed that cost could be published. 167 The 
cost information is an efficiency measure that takes into account what doctors charge 
for their services, as well as how many and what services they provide. 168 The published 
result is a comparison of expected to actual cost provided, 169 though it is not clear in the 
settlement or in Aetna 's materials whether this is the out-of-pocket cost to the consumer 
or the amount charged to the insurer. The quality metrics must be separated out from the 
cost measures, so that they are not mixed into a single metric. 170 If they are combined 
for a total ranking of physician performance, the insurer must disclose the weight given 
to both factors. 171 
While Physician Compare will publish biographical information, including board 
certification and education, it will not integrate the adverse actions housed in the Data 
Bank. Whether and how the Data Bank and Physician Compare could be integrated 
is a large enough topic for its own paper, and will not be addressed in-depth here, but 
the importance of the Data Bank information to the public seems to weigh in favor of 
163 Aetna Leiter, supra note 118, a1 3. 
164 See G. Caleb Alexander et al., 
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166 See Madison, supra note 161 at 241, n. 123. 
167 See Aetna Settlement, supra note 119, at 4. 
168 You, AETNA 1, 4 (2013), 
169 See id. 
171 See id. 
Evaluating Physician Compare: Benefits and Challenges of Scorecards for Individual Physicians 
19 
moving toward integration of the two systems. Patients may not care whether a doctor is 
Board-certified, 172 but citizens' successful efforts to have states publish Data Bank-like 
information on the state level173 show that many patients would like to see information 
on adverse actions and decisions. States publish a patchwork of different reports and 
scorecards on this data, and a publicly available federal system would have the benefits 
of potentially reaching a larger audience and using one standardized methodology 
across the country. On the other hand, allowing states to continue to serve as laboratories 
for this type of information may help researchers isolate the impact and unintended 
consequences publication of this data could cause. 174 
B. Physician Engagement 
CMS has made extensive efforts to engage physicians and other professional stakeholders, 
through the rule making process, town halls, and other avenues. 175 Stakeholders are still 
concerned, however, that the processes used to publish data on Physician Compare are 
not yet transparent enough. For example, commenters have requested that CMS publish 
the results of validity and reliability studies.176 In addition, Physician Compare will not 
include an appeals process. 177 
Without increased efforts to engage physicians and other stakeholders or develop an 
appeals process, CMS may lose physician buy-in of Physician Compare. Again, CMS 
should consider the New York insurance settlement agreements in terms of increasing 
stakeholder buy-in and developing an appeals process. The agreements stress the 
importance of transparency, and that methodology should be fully disclosed. 178 The 
settlements also require the establishment of a "reasonable, prompt, and transparent" 
appeals process in which physicians "have the right to correct errors and seek review of 
data ... and may submit any additional information, including that contained in medical 
charts, for consideration."179 
C. Incentives to Participate 
There is no direct incentive to participate in Physician Compare. However, physicians, 
group practices, and ACOs are incentivized to participate in PQRS through negative 
payment adjustments if they do not report; 18° CMS then automatically pulls the data for 
172 See Madison, supra note 161, at 229. 
173 supra notes 37--42. 
174 See Madison, supra note 28, at 89. 
175 79 Fed. Reg. 67,762 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
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179 
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Physician Compare from PQRS. 181 As noted above, health systems and physicians have 
some leeway in choosing which measures to report, for which patients. 182 
This somewhat discretionary reporting system may lead to gaming, in that individual 
physicians or the entities through which they provide care (i.e. hospital administration) 
could only report PQRS measures on which physicians have done well, for the patients 
who have done well. 183 It could also lead to cherry picking patients, such that individual 
physicians only choose patients whom they believe will be "good" risks. These risks 
could materialize if physicians start to believe (whether accurately or not) that the 
scores on Physician Compare could negatively affect their business. This reaction could 
be particularly acute if physicians believe that the risk adjustment formula does not 
adequately correct artificially decreased quality ratings. 
However, consolidation in the industry may offset the potential for gaming and cherry 
picking because health systems increasingly control how and what providers, particularly 
physicians, report. Hospitals and physicians are consolidating through employment 
arrangements and other structures to achieve the efficiencies of scale necessary to 
improve quality and meet other regulatory requirements. 184 Hospitals are increasingly 
purchasing or establishing other formal business relationships with physician practices, 
and moving from hiring physicians as independent contractors to full-time employees. 185 
This is not a new trend, 186 but it is accelerating in response to the Affordable Care Act 
and other structural pressures for higher-quality, lower-cost care. 187 As a result of this 
consolidation, individual physicians, except those in independent practices, may have 
little control over which quality data is reported through PQRS and therefore have little 
opportunity to game the system and select only low-risk patients. 
Although consolidation may decrease individual physician's direct control over PQRS 
reporting, health systems should be expected to game the system on behalf of physicians. 
For example, if a majority of physicians, or even high-performing physician, receive bad 
scores on a certain measure, the health system may not report that measure the following 
year and may cherry-pick both the patients that it treats and the data that it reports in an 
attempt to artificially increase scores. 
181 See supra notes 65--66. 
182 See supra note 68-69. 
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184 
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PQRS data is also already used to calculate payments under the value-based purchasing 
program, and CMS seems to hint that Physician Compare could be used in the future 
to calculate value-based reimbursement for individual physicians in some way, or at 
least that Physician Compare and value-based purchasing could become more tightly 
linked. 188 Linking Physician Compare more tightly with the value modifier calculations 
may increase physician distrust of Physician Compare because Physician Compare could 
impact not only a physician's professional reputation, but also his or her compensation. 
On the other hand, entwining the two programs could provide an even greater incentive 
for physicians to provide high-quality care. If CMS decides to base payments on data 
published on Physician Compare, it must be sure that the data is accurate and that its 
methodology is as transparent as possible for physicians. 
D. Website Design 
Overall, both the presentation of information on the website and the ease with which 
Physician Compare can be found should be improved. 
CMS states that it uses a combination of stars and numbers to present quality data on 
Physician Compare. 189 However, stars may not be the most effective means to convey 
information to patients. A 2015 study of how best to display physician quality data 
found that patients were most likely to understand quality measures through the display 
of an overall performance score and the use of colored dots and word icons. 190 While 
star ratings were more effective than bars and numbers only, stars were only the third-
most effective rating system in terms of patient understanding. 191 
Although physicians are rated individually with the stars system, CMS has decided 
against comparing physicians to a benchmark or otherwise rating physicians against 
one another. 192 Benchmarking, however, may provide meaningful advantages in 
improving quality, and CMS should more seriously consider including some sort 
of benchmarking or ranking system. For physicians, benchmarking can be effective 
in motivating engagement in quality improvement work and helping them compare 
their performance to others. 193 In addition, benchmarking "can help stimulate healthy 
competition"194 among physicians. Physicians and CMS are already quite familiar 
with and spend a lot of time on benchmarking and rating in other CMS programs, such 
188 See note 99-102. 
189 See Burwell, supra note 102. 
190 See O.C Damman et al, 
191 See id. 
192 supra note 104-05. 
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as the expenditures benchmark in the Medicare Shared Savings Program for ACOs195 
and the Medicare five-star quality rating that allows users to compare nursing homes 
to an average score. 196 CMS' expertise with benchmarking, as well as physicians' 
familiarity with these types of ratings, could translate to more effective development 
of benchmarking on Physician Compare. 
In addition to what will and will not be included in the website design, it is also important 
to consider whether the site is relatively easy to both find and use. One caveat is that, 
as of this writing, Physician Compare only includes biographical data for individual 
physicians and quality scores for group practices and certain individual physicians. 197 
ACO information is on a separate site, though the ACO site has Physician Compare 
in the name. So, the following discussion analyzes only what is currently available. 
However, the current iterations of Physician Compare and the ACO site may signal 
what CMS intends to do in terms of future design for the individual physician quality 
information. Therefore, this is still a useful inquiry. 
CMS plans for both patients and physicians to use Physician Compare, with patients 
utilizing the quality information to make more informed healthcare choices and 
physicians responding to the quality information by improving the quality of care they 
provide. 198 Appealing to these two audiences presents a tough challenge for CMS. The 
agency will need to describe the quality measures in a way that satisfies physicians' 
requests for transparency and comprehensive descriptions of methodology, while still 
keeping the site simple enough to support patient comprehension. The healthcare 
industry entities that use the Data Bank information are steeped in medical malpractice 
litigation, so they most likely have a sense of what a malpractice settlement or adverse 
board action actually means, and would potentially find this information more useful 
than the average patient would if it were published on the site. 199 Similarly, practitioners 
will most likely have a deeper understanding than the average person of quality 
data published on Physician Compare. Further, physicians are clamoring for a more 
comprehensive presentation of information so they can be sure their data is accurate. In 
contrast, lay people may not be able to fully understand and effectively utilize detailed 
quality data.200 In short, the downside of a simpler website and data presentation runs 
the danger of attracting patients but obscuring the true complexity of the data, which 
could upset physicians and reduce buy-in. 
Currently, the Physician Compare and ACO Compare sites skew toward complexity, 
though the design of the sites was not necessarily an intentional decision on the part 
197 See supra notes 7 6-77. 
198 1395w-5 (2010). 
199 See "''LI"~"""• note 28, at 88. 
200 See 
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of CMS to improve accuracy or transparency. For example, the Compare websites for 
ACOs and group practices are completely separate, and it is difficult to navigate between 
them. The main Physician Compare website, where a user can find the group practice 
page and individual physician information that is currently available, does not include 
an obvious link to the ACO Compare website.201 The author had to do an extensive 
Google search to find the ACO Compare website.202 The challenge of finding the ACO 
Compare sites through a simple Google search203 may mean patients will not use the 
site.204 As ACOs move toward increasing levels of care coordination across health 
systems,205 ACO quality data is arguably as important as individual physician data, if 
not more so, for a patient seeking high quality care. CMS should consider strategies to 
streamline the sites. Currently, the individual physician biographies include a link to 
the physician's group affiliation(s) that brings patients to information on the affiliated 
group. CMS could consider doing the same for ACOs with which individual physicians 
are affiliated. 
Despite CMS' efforts to improve usability,206 Physician Compare for group practices 
is still fairly unwieldy and the star system does not appear to be widely implemented. 
The group practices page does not indicate which practices are scored (with the star 
system or otherwise) and which are not. As a result, the user must randomly select 
practices and may not find any group practices that have quality scores. The author 
did not, in fact, find any group practices that had quality scores. Rather, in the field for 
quality programs on all of the group practices the author selected, no quality data was 
presented although there was a link to an outside website that describes the CMS quality 
programs. Similarly, the author was unable to find individual physicians with quality 
ratings on Physician Compare in searches by physician name, specialty, and location. 
The difficulties of even finding the ACO Compare site, combined with the lack of clear 
quality data on the ACO Compare site and for group practices on the Physician Compare 
site, are issues CMS will need to address in future iteration for individual physicians if 
the data on individual physicians is going to be useful. It should also not be difficult for 
users to determine which physicians or practices have quality ratings and those ratings 
should be presented consistently across the sites. 
201 Compare, MEDICARE.Gov 
the other Medicare Compare websites on Compare, which is where a user would 
expect to find the link. Rather, one must click on a link for "ACO data" under "additional 
information."). 
Reporting, CMS. Gov., nm·N·11w1•rw 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). Note that once on the 
MidwesternACO (SSM HealthACO) and found that 
less so, to find the Compare site for group 
204 See Hanauer, supra note l 60, at 734. 
20s Care, CMS.Gov., 
206 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
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In addition to making the site understandable for patients, CMS needs to encourage 
patients to find and use Physician Compare. As mentioned above, Physician Compare, 
particularly for ACOs, is currently hard to find and there does not appear to have been 
much dissemination to patients. Poor dissemination may limit patients' use of the sites, 
even if they would find the information useful.207 The possibility of supporting more 
patients in using the site and making informed healthcare decisions is still of value. To 
further reach patients, CMS should consider increasing outreach and marketing about 
the individual physician site, perhaps by working with health systems and physicians 
to provide information in their offices and during appointments. Physician Compare 
could also be more closely integrated with healthcare.gov so that patients could have 
the information on quality at their fingertips when choosing a health insurance plan. For 
example, a patient could see which physicians and ACOs she prefers based on quality 
scores, then choose a plan through which she could receive care from that physician 
and/or ACO. 
CONCLUSION 
Physician Compare has the potential to fulfill its dual goals of incentivizing physicians to 
provide higher-quality care and supporting patients in becoming more active, informed 
consumers. However, much work remains to be done. To maintain and grow physician 
engagement, CMS must also continue efforts to ensure that Physician Compare 's 
quality measures are accurate and are published in a transparent, understandable way. 
Without increased dissemination and efforts to improve the clarity and usability of 
Physician Compare, patients will not be able to fully utilize the information on quality 
in choosing physicians. 
207 See Dem1is P Scanlon et. al., Are Healthcare "Report Cards" Consumers? 
f'mnii11tir.m. 21 AM. J MANAG. CARE 236, 243 (Mar. 2015), 
consumers-awareness-in-the-chronically-ill-populaiion/P-3. Note, however, that even with effective 
outreach, may choose not to use the site for other reasons. Id. (finding that may be 
satisfied with their existing provider and not motivated to for an alternative). Note that other 
eeasons may also contribute to consumer choice not to use the sites. See Hanauer, supra note 160, 
at 734 that may not use sites because their insurance limits their choice of 
value the opinions of family and friends over websites in a 
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